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CONFLICT OF LAWS:
EXTRATERRITORIAL ENFORCEMENT OF TAX CLAIMS
That one state will not enforce the revenue laws of another is a rule
of law which survives in an environment contrary to the reasons for
its existence., Although the fiscal needs and demands of modern gov-
ernment impose a heavy burden on the taxpayer, the rule has pro-
vided an avenue of escape by enabling an individual to avoid payment
of taxes by crossing state lines. For those who accept the responsi-
bilities of citizenship and pay their taxes, this burden is increased.
Surely, when the fiscal needs of government are so demanding, rules
favoring tax collection and not tax evasion should be stressed. Never-
theless, the doctrine that one state will not enforce the revenue laws of
another persists, and until recently few states have recognized that
it has little place in a union of states. The purpose of this note is to
present and evaluate the reasons given to support the rule, to show a
trend toward its rejection, and to suggest some prerequisites for one
state to successfully maintain an action to enforce its revenue laws in
another state.
The doctrine was first enunciated by an English court in an action
between one of her citizens and a citizen of a foreign country and con-
cerned the delivery of gold that had been smuggled out of Portugal.2
The court refused to give effect to a Portuguese revenue law which
prohibited the exportation of gold, stating that it was needed in Eng-
land and that to hold otherwise would adversely affect English com-
merce. The rule, then, was born of commercial necessity and was first
applied as a principle of international law. This rule was later em-
ployed by English courts, 3 but none of the early cases in which it ap-
peared concerned an attempt to collect a tax by a foreign state. The
1. 3 Beale, Conflict of Laws §§ 610.1, 610.2 (1935) ; Goodrich, Conflict of Laws
§ 66 (3d ed. 1949); Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 610, comment c (1934).
Numerous writers have criticized the application of this rule in the United
States. The following are illustrative of this criticism. Freeze, Extraterritorial
Enforcement of Revenue Laws, 23 Wash. U.L.Q. 321 (1938); Leflar, Extrastate
Enforcement of Penal and Governmental Claims, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 215-25
(1932); Note, 29 Colum. L. Rev. 782 (1929); Note, 18 Cornell L.Q. 581 (1933);
34 Calif. L. Rev. 754 (1946).
2. Boucher v. Lawson, Cases temp. Hardwick 85, 89, 194, 95 Eng. Rep. 53, 55,
125 (K.B. 1734).
3. Sharp v. Taylor, 2 Phill. 801, 41 Eng. Rep. 1153 (Ch.D. 1849); Planche v.
Fletcher, 1 Doug. 251, 99 Eng. Rep. 164 (K.B. 1779); Holman v. Johnson, 1
Cowp. 341, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120 (K.B. 1775). For a discussion of these cases see
Freeze, supra note 1, at 322-26.
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rule was first applied in the United States in Randall v. Rensseler,4
a case concerning the enforcement of a promissory note which had
been executed in France, but which lacked the requisite French reve-
nue stamps. A New York court allowed recovery on the note, even
though it had not been executed in accordance with the laws of
France, saying that the courts of New York did not sit to enforce
the revenue laws of another country.5 The rule was first applied in
this country to enforce a contract.
The rule, although previously mentioned in one decision,G was not
the basis for a state's refusal to give extraterritorial enforcement to
the tax claims of another state until the early twentieth century.7 In
Maryland v. Turner8 an attempt by Maryland to collect a tax owed
by the defendant was thwarted when the New York court held that
revenue laws, like penal laws, belong to a class of laws that are never
accorded extraterritorial enforcement." While the Turner case was a
clear application of the rule to prevent the collection of a state tax,
the court in Colorado v. Harbecklk--a case often cited as supporting
the rule-only mentioned it in dictum and based its refusal to enforce
the tax claim of a foreign state on constitutional grounds. 1 That case
involved an attempt to collect a transfer tax in New York on the estate
of a former resident of Colorado. The rule was only mentioned to
refute the taxing state's contention that its attorney general had the
power to enforce the tax by common law action in another state, the
court declaring that the contention conflicted with the settled prin-
ciple of private international law which precludes one state from col-
lecting the taxes of a sister state and from enforcing its penal and
revenue laws.12 In both the Turner and Hrbeck cases the courts, in
considering the rule, stated that the reasons for not enforcing the
4. 1 Johns. *94 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1806).
5. Id. at *96.
6. Henry v. Sargeant, 13 N.H. 321, 325 (1843).
7. Maryland v. Turner, 75 Misc. 9, 132 N.Y. Supp. 173 (Sup. Ct. 1911). The
case of Holshauser v. Copper Co., 138 N.C. 248, 50 S.E. 650 (1905) deserves some
mention. This case was the first instance in which a state court was asked to
collect a tax due another state. The North Carolina Supreme Court allowed the
state of New Jersey to present a claim against the defendant for back taxes
when the defendant went into receivership. No mention was made of the rule
against the extraterritorial enforcement of state taxes.
8. See note 7 supra.
9. 75 Misc. at 10-13, 132 N.Y. Supp. at 174-6.
10. 232 N.Y. 71, 133 N.E. 357 (1921).
11. Id. at 83, 133 N.E. at 359.
12. Id. at 85, 133 N.E. at 360. It Is a well established principle of international
law that the courts of one country will not execute the penal laws of another.
The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825). The same principle is true
between states. Goodrich, Conflict of Laws § 12 (3d ed. 1949).
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revenue laws of another state were (a) precedent and (b) the penal
nature of these laws. As previously stated, these decisions, rather
than following precedent, were the first to apply the rule to prevent
a sister state from collecting a tax. The suggestion that revenue laws
are analogous to penal statutes is likewise subject to criticism.13 Penal
laws aim at punishing offenses against the state; revenue laws are
based on the pecuniary obligation of the citizen to the state for ser-
vices rendered.' Although it would be contrary to a theory of retrib-
utive justice for a state whose laws have not been violated to punish
an individual, because tax laws are not attempts to punish, this theory
has no validity when applied to revenue statutes.15 Further, even
state penal laws are accorded some degree of extraterritorial enforce-
ment by the process of extradition, whereas no like process is avail-
able to aid states in the collection of taxes.16 Perhaps, if the analogy
of penal and revenue laws had gained impetus, the taxing state would
have obtained a similar process. The courts, however, sought other
reasons for applying the rule.
In Moore v. Mitchell'7 Judge Learned Hand, concurring in the ap-
plication of the rule to defeat the taxing state's claim, reasoned that
the rule was sound because it avoided delicate and embarrassing situ-
ations which might otherwise result if one state were to enforce and
thereby pass on the validity of the revenue laws of another."" Three
arguments have been asserted to rebut this reasoning. 9 First, it is
probable that the revenue laws of the taxing state will have been
previously interpreted by its own courts so that another forum would
have little difficulty in their application. Moreover, the taxing state
would not be likely to complain of the manner in which its revenue
laws are applied, since it affirmatively seeks their application. And
third, it is difficult to see how the taxing state's relationship with its
citizens would be embarrassed, since the same defenses to the tax
13. See State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Rodgers, 238 Mo. App. 1115, 193
S.W.2d 919 (1946) ; Leflar, supra note 1, at 219-20; Note, 41 fl1. L. Rev. 439, 441
(1946); Note, 10 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 205, 206 (1948). For a case by case study of
the analogy between penal and revenue laws see 15 U. Kan. City L. Rev. 52
(1946-47).
14. See Huntington v. Attril, 146 U.S. 657, 673-74 (1892); Freeze, supra note
1, at 328-30; Note, 18 Cornell L.Q. 581 (1933); Note, 10 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 205, 206
(1949).
15. State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Rodgers, 238 Mo. App. 1115, 1127,
193 S.W.2d 919, 926 (1946).
16. Leflar, supra note 1, at 200-01.
17. 30 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1929), aff'd on other grounds, 281 U.S. 18 (1930).
18. Id. at 604.
19. See Freeze, supra note 1, at 333; Note, 46 Colum. L. Rev. 1013, 1014-15
(1946); Note, 41 II. L. Rev. 439, 441-42 (1946); Note, 47 Mich. L. Rev. 796,
799-801 (1949).
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claim could be asserted by the evader in the forum of trial as would
be available to him in the taxing state. To Judge Hand's further sug-
gestion that extraterritorial enforcement of state revenue laws might
contravene the public policy of the enforcing state,20 the answer has
been given that there should be no general policy against state tax
collection and that the enforcing state should realize that tax revenues
are vital to the existence of governments. 21 Although it is realized
that there could be situations in which one state should refuse to en-
force the revenue laws of another, i.e., where the tax is confiscatory in
nature or where the enforcement of another state's revenue laws
would be detrimental to the enforcing state's collection of its own
taxes, these situations seldom occur and cannot sustain a rule which
refuses to give extraterritorial enforcement to any state revenue law.
A final reason advanced to support the rule is that, if one state
were to enforce the revenue laws of another, a substantial burden
would be placed on the enforcing state by adding to already crowded
dockets.22 With the possible exception of New York, this reasoning
seems to have little basis in fact. Generally, substantial amounts of
revenue have been involved when one state has sought the extrater-
ritorial enforcement of its tax claims.2- No doubt most instances of
tax evasion which occur when the taxpayer crosses state lines involve
trivial amounts that the taxing state would not attempt to collect in
the courts of another state because the expense would exceed the an-
ticipated revenue. The relatively small number of cases in which one
state has sought extraterritorial enforcement of its tax claims indi-
cates that no great burden on court dockets would result from a re-
laxation of the rule. Excepting possibly New York, the tax claims of
one state should not be defeated on this basis.24 Because many of its
citizens own property in other states, special circumstances might be
present in New York that would urge it not to enforce the tax claims
of sister states. Probably, this is the reason why New York has been,
and remains, the staunchest supporter of the rule, even though that
has not been the reason given for its application.25
20. 30 F.2d at 604.
21. See authorities cited at note 19 supra.
22. Freeze, supra note 1, at 334; Note, 97 U. Pa. L. Rev. 435, n.12 (1949).
23. See, e.g., California ex rel. Houser v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 260
S.W.2d 821 (Mo. App. 1953) ($4,349.75); City of Detroit v. Proctor, 44 Del. 193,
61 A.2d 412 (1948) ($3,420.75).
24. See Note, U. Pa. L. Rev. 435, 536 n.12 (1949).
25. Wayne County v. American Steel Export Co., 227 App. Div. 585, 101
N.Y.S.2d 522, (1st Dept. 1950); Wayne County v. Foster & Reynolds Co., 227
App. Div. 1105, 101 N.Y.S.2d 526, (1st Dept. 1950); In re Martin's Estate, 136
Misc. 51, 240 N.Y. Supp. 393 (Surr. Ct. 1930), aff'd on another ground, 255
N.Y. 359, 174 N.E. 753 (1931); In re Bliss' Estate, 121 Misc. 773, 202 N.Y.
Supp. 185 (Surr. Ct. 1923).
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Since the reasons generally given to support this rule are on close
inspection insufficient to sustain its validity and continued applica-
tion, it is not surprising that the states would seek some method of
limiting the rule. New York, despite its opposition to the extraterri-
torial enforcement of revenue laws, was involved in the first case lim-
iting the scope of this rule. In New York v. Coe Mfg. Co.26 that state
reduced a franchise tax claim to judgment and sought its enforce-
ment in New Jersey. The New Jersey court enforced the judgment
and held that the original character of the claim had merged in it.27
This decision would probably not have received unanimous acceptance
by the states 8 had not the United States Supreme Court held in Mil-
waukee County v. M. E. White Co.29 that a judgment of the taxing
state was enforceable in another state, and that it was not to be
denied full faith and credit merely because the underlying claim was
for taxes.30 This decision firmly established the law with regard to
the extraterritorial enforcement of tax claims which have been re-
duced to judgment,31 but the Court expressly left open the question of
whether full faith and credit had to be given the tax claims of another
state.32 Thus, the Milwaukee County case did not substantially im-
pair the rule and, although several states have recently aided another
state in the collection of its taxes, the basic problem of enforcing tax
claims is present today when one state is unable within its own juris-
diction to enforce its revenue laws.
The first case expressly rejecting the rule was State ex rel. Okla-
homa Tax Comm'n v. Rodgers- which concerned an action brought in
Missouri to collect income taxes that had accrued against the defen-
dant while he was a citizen of Oklahoma. The St. Louis Court of Ap-
peals, after considering the historical development of the rule and the
reasons that had been used to support it, reversed a decision dismiss-
ing the action and held that there was no valid reason for the courts
of one state not to enforce the revenue laws of another, since the
"simplest ideas of comity would seem to compel such a result, and
modern conditions demand it."'3 The reasoning of the court was that
26. 112 N.J.L. 536, 172 Atl. 198 (Ct. Err. & App. 1934); see Note, 42 Yale
L.J. 1131 (1933).
27. Id. at 538-40, 172 At1. at 199-200.
28. See Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 290 (1887) (dictum).
29. 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
30. Id. at 279.
31. See Goodrich, Conflict of Laws § 66 (3d ed. 1949).
32. 296 U.S. at 275.
33. 238 Mo. App. 1115, 193 S.W.2d 919 (1946). For discussion of this case see
Note, 34 Calif. L. Rev. 754 (1946); Note, 46 Colum. L. Rev. 1013 (1946); Note,
41 Ill. L. Rev. 439 (1946); Note, 31 Minn. L. Rev. 93 (1946).
34. 238 Mo. App. at 1128, 193 S.W.2d at 927.
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the principle of comity could prevent the taxpayer who enjoyed the
benefits of government from avoiding his share of the expense by
merely crossing state lines.35 The rule that had developed out of com-
mercial necessity was declared to have no place in a union of states.
The Rodgers decision has since been cited with approval in Missouri,16
found acceptance in the courts of Kentucky, 7 Arkansas, 8 and Illi-
nois,3° and received favorable mention in the Restatement of the Con-
flict of Laws.4 0 It has not, however, been universally followed. In
City of Detroit v. Proctor," decided two years after the Rodgers case,
the Delaware Supreme Court held that the principle that one state
will not enforce the revenue laws of another state was too well settled
to be overturned in the absence of clear legislative direction. 42 Other
recent decisions attest that the rule precluding extraterritorial en-
forcement of tax claims has not been completely discarded. 4 Since it
is felt that this rule is inappropriate in a union of states and that the
Rodgers case enunciates a preferable position, a close appraisal of
those decisions that have rejected the rule should be made in order to
ascertain what prerequisites are required before one state will en-
force the revenue laws of another.
The Rodgers case, being based on the principle of comity, may be
somewhat misleading, for the term "comity" is subject to some con-
fusion.44 Used in a loose sense in connection with the rule, this term
may have meant that Missouri enforced the Oklahoma revenue law
out of mere courtesy, but the better view is that comity is dependent
upon additional factors that were present in that decision.41 It is sub-
mitted that these additional factors were the Oklahoma statutes which
35. Ibid.
36. California ex rel. Houser v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 260 S.W.2d 821
(Mo. App. 1953), dismissed, 348 U.S. 932 (1955).
37. Ohio ex rel. Duffy v. Arnett, 314 Ky. 403, 234 S.W.2d 722 (1950).
38. State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Neely, 225 Ark. 230, 282 S.W.2d 150
(1955).
39. City of Detroit v. Gould, 12 Ill. 2d 297, 146 N.E.2d 61 (1957).
40. A caveat to Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 610, comment c (1934) said
that, in recognition of the Rodgers case, the Institute would express no opinion
whether an action could be maintained by a foreign state on a tax claim, but
added that if a position were to be taken it would follow the Rodgers decision. Re-
statement of the Law 174 (Supp. 1948).
41. 44 Del. 193, 61 A.2d 412 (1948).
42. Id. at 203, 61 A.2d at 416.
43. In re Assignment of Film Classics to Kaufman, 152 N.Y.S.2d 565 (Sup. Ct.
1956); Wayne County v. American Steel Export Co., 227 App. Div. 585, 101
N.Y.S.2d 522 (1st Dept. 1950); Wayne County v. Foster & Reynolds Co., 227
App. Div. 1105, 101 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1st Dept. 1950).
44. See Goodrich, Conflict of Laws § 7 (3d ed. 1949).
45. Ibid.
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provided that an action could be maintained for taxes in the same
manner as for a personal debt,46 and which guaranteed that the state
would recognize and enforce liability for taxes lawfully imposed by
other states which extended a like comity to Oklahoma.47 With this
guarantee of reciprocity, the court's use of the term "comity" in en-
forcing the tax claim of a sister state is given meaning beyond that of
mere courtesy. In the Arkansas case that followed the Rodgers view
the taxing state was again Oklahoma, whose statutes guaranteed a
like comity.48 The Kentucky Supreme Court in rejecting the tradi-
tional rule declared that it could find nothing to indicate that Ohio,
the taxing state, would not enforce the tax claims of Kentucky should
the occasion arise.", The importance of reciprocity to the Missouri
view is pointed out by the case of California ex rel. Houser v. St. Louis
Union Trust Co." In that case the Rodgers court cited its former
decision with approval, but refused to enforce a California inheritance
tax claim. In recognition of its former opinion, the court said that it
was soundly ruled and that there should be "no absolute bar to extra-
territorial suits to collect any or every type of tax from former resi-
dents." 51 However, the court found that the California Revenue and
Tax Code,52 under which the tax was assessed, named one specific
court as having jurisdiction over the collection of inheritance taxes
and held that the cause of action was made intransitory by these
statutes, stating that when a legislature so ties together a right and a
remedy it is impossible for the courts of other states to exercise juris-
diction.53 Other provisions of the California statutes that were in
force when the tax was assessed empowered the attorney general to
bring suits in other states for all tax claims generally and extended
comity to states that allowed the action5 However, when this suit
was brought, these provisions had been amended and expressly ex-
46. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 68, § 1464 (1941).
47. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 68, § 1483 (1941) provides: "The courts of this State
shall recognize and enforce liability for taxes lawfully imposed by other States
which extend a like comity to this State."
48. In State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Neely, 225 Ark. 230, 282 S.W.2d
150 (1955) the pertinent comity statute was Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 68, § 1483
(1941).
49. Ohio ex rel. Duffy v. Arnett, 314 Ky. 403, 413, 234 S.W.2d 722, 727 (1950).
The legislature of Kentucky has commanded the courts to enforce the tax claims
of those states which extend Kentucky a like comity. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
135.190 (1950).
50. 260 S.W.2d 821 (Mo. App. 1953).
51. Id. at 829.
52. Cal. Rev. & Tax Code Ann. § 14651 (Deering 1939).
53. 260 S.W.2d at 831.
54. Cal. Polit. Code § 3671 (e) (Deering 1944).
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cluded inheritance tax claims.,- Thus, at the time California sought to
enforce an inheritance tax claim, the California statutes provided
that it would not enforce a similar claim of another state. It is sub-
mitted that this is what prompted the decision of the court in the
St. Louis Union Trust Co. case. It is doubtful that the California
legislature meant to limit the collection of these taxes to a specific
court, since it expressly empowered the attorney general to maintain
actions for all taxes in other states. Therefore, the holding that an
intransitory cause of action was created by statute is questionable 6a
What was created was a situation in which Missouri was asked to
enforce the revenue laws of another state when that state had ex-
pressly declared that Missouri would not be extended a like comity.
The influence of the Missouri view reached its peak recently in
City of Detroit v. Gould,57 which concerned an action brought in Illi-
nois to collect a tax on personal property that had been assessed
against the defendant while he was a resident of Detroit. In that
case the Supreme Court of Illinois reversed a decision of the lower
court which had dismissed the suit by application of the rule that
one state will not enforce the revenue laws of another and held that
there was "no reason of comity" upon which to deny the action or
refuse to enforce the Michigan tax."8 In reaching this decision the
court declared that it was following the Missouri view59 It should be
noted, however, that one important aspect of the Missouri view was
absent in this decision. Unlike the situation in the Rodgers case and in
the Arkansas decision that followed its lead,60 the taxing state in the
Gould case had no statute that would guarantee that Illinois would
receive like treatment if the situation were reversed. Nor did the
court seem concerned over the question of reciprocity61 There was
nothing to indicate whether Michigan would or would not extend
comity to Illinois in the extraterritorial enforcement of its tax claims.
This is not to suggest that the failure to raise the question of reci-
procity renders unsound the rejection of the traditional rule in the
Gould case. As has been pointed out, that rule lacks the support of
reason when applied to a union of states and should be rejected. It is
merely to suggest that the Illinois Supreme Court seems to have given
55. Cal. Rev. & Tax Code Ann. § 31 (Deering Supp. 1957).
56. Comment, 1955 Wash. U.L.Q. 310.
57. 12 Ill. 2d 297, 146 N.E.2d 61 (1957).
58. Id. at 304, 146 N.E.2d at 64.
59. Id. at 303, 146 N.E.2d at 63.
60. State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Neely, 225 Ark. 230, 282 S.W.2d 150
(1955).
61. This was a definite concern of the court in Ohio ex rel. Duffy v. Arnett, 314
Ky. 403, 234 S.W.2d 722 (1950). See note 50 supra and text supported thereby.
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further extension to the Missouri view as enunciated in the Rodgers
case.
Except for the Gould case, a concern for reciprocity would appear
to be an important factor to the enforcement of foreign revenue laws.
In two of those cases in which the traditional rule was rejected, the
state seeking to have its tax claims enforced guaranteed the enforcing
state reciprocity by statute. 2 In the other decision the court found
that there was no evidence to suggest that the taxing state would not
so reciprocate should the occasion arise.63 Where, however, the evi-
dence clearly showed that the taxing state would not grant this re-
ciprocity, as in the St. Louis Union Trust Co. case, the tax claim was
not enforced. Therefore, it would seem that a comity provision is a
wise, if not necessary, addition to the statutes of any state that seeks
the extraterritorial enforcement of its revenue laws. However, the
fact that the enforcing state has adopted a comity statute does not
by itself mean that another state will enforce its revenue laws. The
traditional rule has behind it the weight of authority and City of De-.
troit v. Proctor 4 clearly shows that some courts are reluctant to re-
ject this rule without clear direction from their own legislatures. The
rationale of the Proctor decision indicated that the Supreme Court of
Delaware felt that, even if the taxing state had a comity statute, the
enforcement of the revenue laws of another state should be left to
the determination of the Delaware legislature.6 5 The Delaware court
also stated that it was the legislature, rather than the courts, that
was best able to define the proper scope for enforcing the tax claims
of another state.6 For these reasons, it is submitted that the various
state legislatures must take the lead if the traditional rule is to be
completely rejected.
What legislation, then, is necessary to overcome the rule against
extraterritorial enforcement of state tax claims?67 From a reading
of those cases which have rejected the rule and in which one state
enforced the tax claims of another, it is submitted that the necessary
statutory provisions would be as follows: (1) a provision making a
lawfully assessed tax a debt due the state at the time of assessment
and making it collectible in the same manner as a personal debt;68
(2) a provision allowing state tax claims to be pursued in any court
of competent jurisdiction; (3) a provision empowering a state official
62. Text refers to Rodgers and Neely cases.
63. Text refers to Arnett case.
64. 44 Del. 193, 61 A.2d 412 (1948).
65. Id. at 203, 61 A.2d at 416.
66. Ibid.
67. See generally, Legislation, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 828, 834 (1935).
68. See note 46 supra.
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to maintain extraterritorial action on behalf of the state to enforce
its tax claims ;69 (4) a provision guaranteeing reciprocity to any other
state that will enforce its tax claims;70 and (5) a provision detailing
those taxes that are not included within these comity provisions or
which will not be enforced by the state.7 1 These provisions should
overcome the objection that the remedy provided by the taxing state
to enforce its tax claims is intransitory in nature and can only be
pursued in the courts of that state, or that the person seeking to
enforce the tax claim is without authority to do so. The last pro-
vision is a recognition of the fact that there may be situations in
which the courts of one state will not enforce the revenue laws of an-
other because to do so would contravene a valid state policy2 and is
an announcement of those situations.
Because there can be situations in which the enforcement of an-
other state's tax claims would contravene some valid public policy, it
is doubtful that the traditional rule will ever become completely
extinct. For this same reason, it is also unlikely that Congress will
ever enact legislation or the Supreme Court render an opinion that
requires one state to enforce the revenue laws of another. If the
states are desirous of having their tax claims given extraterritorial
effect, it is the legislatures that must provide the lead, each placing
the traditional rule in its proper setting; for it is the legislature that
is primarily concerned with the collection of taxes owed the state.
69. See Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 211.13, 211.39-.40, 609.13 (1948).
70. See note 47 supra.
71. See note 55 supra.
72. See text supported by notes 20-21 supra.
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